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................___,__ _
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Defendant and Appellant.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM C. MOORE & COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

8607

DELFINO SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
and

WILLIAM C. MOORE & COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

8608

ILIFF GARDNER,
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendants and Appellants respectfully petition the
Supreme Court of Utah for rehearing in the above entitled causes, and in support thereof point out that the
Supreme Court failed to consider in its decision as
rendered the 27th day of June, 1957 in the above entitled
causes the two following particulars :
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STATEMENT OF POINT'S
1. That the record on appeal consisted solely of the
judgment role and that the Supreme Court should have
;;truck what was designated as supplemental record on
appeal.
2. That there was nothing before the Supreme Court
save and e~cept the sufficiency of the pleadings to raise
an issue of fact and whether or not the plaintiffs motion
to strike defendants second defense was properly granted
or not, on the basis of the record.
ARGUMENT
These points will be argued in the manner presented
rather than in the ~equence of the Supreme Court Ruling.
Under rule 75a of the Utah rules of Civil Procedure
of Utah, the following is set forth:
(a) DESiGNATION OF CONTENTS OF RECORD ON APPEAL. Within 10 days after the filing of the notice of appeal, the appellant shall
serve upon the respondent and file with the district court a designation of the portions of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be contained in
the record on appeal unless the respondent has
already served and filed a re.signation. Within
10 days after the service and filing of such a
designation, any other party to the appeal may
serve and file a designation of additional portions
of the record, proceedings, and evidene.e to be
included. If the respondent files the original
designation, the parties shall proceed under subdivision (b) of this rule a.s if the respondent were
the appellant.
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the attempt of the respondents to bring up before this
Court after appellants briefs were filed, additional portions which they called supplemental record amounted to
an attempt to file a transcript or bill of exceptions.
Under the old code the method and procedure followed
by respondents, as far as attorney for appellants is able
to determine, ha.s never before, been condoned by any
Court. Anything except the pleadings which have been
taken before any appellate Court has under all other
jurisdictions been held to be part of the bill of exceptions
and must be submitted to the opposing party for settlement and if not settled in that manner then submitted to
the trial Court for settlement.
It is admitted by attorney for appellants that our
present rules do not cover this step in arriving at the
proper transcript of testimony or argument. Rule 75b
attempts to cover this but there is no• provision in that
rule for submission to the opposing party for corrections,
amendments, or alterations, and if the deci.sion of the
Supreme Court stands as rendered on June 27, 1957 in
the two causes involved there will be no appellate procedure in the State of rtah, in that any party who is a
party respondent in an appeal may sit back and wait until
such time as appellants briefs are filed, then apply for
additional matters which were not matters of the record
from the District Court, claiming .surprise, error or accident, and without notice to the other party, file their
briefs and in effect entrap the opposing party or the
appellant whose only recourse would be to apply for addi-
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tional time before the Supreme Court to prepare a r.eply
brief or apply to the Supreme Court for correction of a
transcript.
In this instance respondents obtained a transcript
without notice, without settlement, obtained an extension
of tin1e in which to file their briefs and the matter was set
down for hearing on ~Yfh .short notice as to leave appellant with no time with"whieh to prepare a reply brief. In
the motion of respondents for supplemental record, there
was no .allegation of error or accident or that there was
any mistatements in the record as filed in the Supreme
Court and in fact respondents knew or should have
known what was in the record a long time prior to the
filing of appellants briefs as they had argued a motion
to dismi.ss for failure to file the record on time and
appellants time was shortened within which to file his
briefs, because of this motion; there was no showing of
any sort of surprise, error, or accident in their motion.
It is appellants earnest contention that rule 75 subdivision
(a) as hereinabove cited, is controlling upon this.
In American Juris prudence volume 3, page 266, section 666, the following general rule is set forth:
At some point in the preparation of the bill
of exceptions, tl1e attorney for the opposite party
must, under tl1e modern practice, have the opportunity of examining it and approving or disapproving it. Failure to furnish this opportunity
defeats the bill.
If the procedure as approved by the Supreme Court in
this case is followed, then no appellant or respondent
4
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would be entitled to any notice or submission of a bill
of exceptions for correction or amendments, such bill
would and could be submitted to the District Court for
approval and lodged with the Supreme Court without any
opportunity on the part of respondent or appellant to
have hearing upon the validity of such bill. The entire
appellate procedure could become a mockery. See the
following citations:
Scott vs. Hansen, 279 Pac. 2nd 654, Oklahoma
case; Case-made settled and signed without notice
to opposing parties of time and place of settling
and signing the case-made, and without appearance of such party or parties, and without their
waiver of such notice, is a nullity and confers no
jurisdiction on Supreme Court to decide questions
thereunder. . . .
Palin vs. General Construction Company, 277
Pac. 2nd 703, 45 Washington 2nd 721. ... Party,
upon whom proposed statement of facts has been
served, fails to proposed amendments at his peril
for, if it be determined that the proposed statement wa.s filed in good faith and with the intent
that it be a full and complete record of the material facts, matters, and proceedings theretofore
occurring in the cause, such party is deemed to
have agreed to it and does not have any right
thereafter to propose or suggest amendments,
corrections, or supplementations.
As to point two, it appears to the appellants that
the Supreme Court has taken as a matter of fact the
statements of counsel for plaintiffs and respondents that
the transactions involved in these causes were transactions in inter-state commerce rather than intra-state
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commerce. If the oral statements of coun.sel can be used
as a basis of a motion to strike when no evidence has been
introduced by the defendants in support of their contentions, then indeed will we have chaos on our practice.
Assuming that the Supreme Court had a right to see the
contract, a copy of which was attached to one of the
depositions of defendants and appellants here, would it
be that this Court is going to reverse all of the modern
decisions in regard to foreign corporations and hold
that a single item of evidence on one side is sufficient
to grant a motion of law to strike a pleading? This Court
and all other jurisdictions have repeatedly held that
there is no rule of thumb by which to judge to whether
a foreign corporation is doing business in inter-state commerce or intra-state commerce, but that each case must
turn upon its own facts. Nowhere and at no stage of
the proceeding did appellants and defendants admit that
these contracts were New York contracts, in fact it was
definitely stated that appellants contention was that these
were Utah contracts regardles.s of the wording therein
contained. This could only be shown by testimony relating to the intention and conduct of the parties.
It is strange that only certain portions of the statute
which is controlling is referred to in the decision, to-wit:
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 16-8-3 is quoted as
followed by the Supreme Court:
"Any foreign corporation doing business
within thi.s state and failing to comply with the
provisions of sections 16-8-1 and 16-S-2 shall not
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be entitled to the benefit of the laws of this state
relating to corporations, and shall not sue, .... in
any of the courts of this state .... "
however, in reading the whole of the statute as it applies
to this ca.se, there is a vastly different and broader meaning. The portions omitted from the above quotations are
as follows:
.... and shall not sue, prosecute or maintain any
action, suit, counterclaim, cross complaint or proceeding in .any of the courts of this state on any
claim, interest or demand arising or growing out
of or founded on any tort occuring, or of any contract, agreement or transaction made or entered
into, in this .state by such corporation or by its
assignors .... and every contract, agreement and
transaction whatsoever made or entered into by or
on behalf of any such corporation within this state
or to be executed or performed within this state
shall be wholly void on behalf of such corporation
and its assignees and every person deriving any
intere.st or title therefrom, but shall be valid and
enforceable against such corporation, assignee
and person ....
In this instance the Wm. C. Moore Company, by their
agreement, and through the conduct of their agents who
solicited the orders, set out definite landscaping plans for
the various proposed customers, and agreed to replace
items which were found to be faulty and render variou.s
other services which .appear on the contract, either on the
face or the back thereof, which in effect renders it a Utah
contract, regardless of the wording that said contract
shall be only construed as a New York contract. The
question· of whether or not this corporation can be shown
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to be doing business within the state of Utah is a que.stion
of fact and will have to be determined through the evidence submitted at the trial of this cause. This rule is
substantially set forth in the case of Modern Housing
Manufacturing CompanY' vs. Cartier et al, 149 Federal
2nd, page 980 where on page 985 the Court used the following language :
"From this line of reasoning has stemmed
the rule laid down and continuously followed by
the Supreme Court for many years, that when
a corporation is engaged in interstate commerce in
a state other than that of its residence, and as a
related part of such engagement there perfonns
acts which are merely incidental to the carrying
on of such commerce, such act_s will not constitute
doing business in that state within the meaning of
such a st.a te statute as that of Wisconsin. The converse of this is true. If such acts performed in
another state are not merely incidental to the
interstate commerce, but are substantial with respect thereto, then it is carrying on business in
that state, .and is subject to reasonable requirement of the state statute. In the cases where the
corporation has been relieved from the effect of
such a statute, it was not merely because it was
engaged in interstate commerce, but also because
the unreasonable requiren1ents of the statute
amounted to regulation of interstate commerce, or
because the acts complained of were merely incidental to interstate con1merce and did not amount
to doing business in these state within the meaning of such statute. So far as we know all states
have such a statute. They were enacted for the
benefit and convenience of the citizen.ship generally, .and the 'Visconsin statute bears the distinction of having the approval of the Supreme Court
as to its reasonableness."
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It would be a strange interpretation of law indeed if
the Courts of this land would interpret a statut'e such as
ours to run only to the benefit of the .state governments
for taxation purposes and not to the benefit of the citizens as a whole, especially where the statute provides definitely that all contracts entered into in violation of
Section 16-8-3 shall be void, and does not limit such contracts to those involving state or municipal gove.rnments
and their taxation authority. It is defendant's contention
that in view of the .statute as enacted under the Title 16,
Chapter 8, Sub-section 3 by the Utah Legislature it was
the intent and is fully set forth under said statute that
the citizens of the state were the ones to be protected
from the acts of corporations such as plaintiff.
Appellants therefore respectfully submit that petition for rehearing be granted and that the judgment of
this Court be rever.sed and that the cause be submitted
back to the District Court for trial of the issues and the
ascertainment of the facts, and that the supplemental
record as attempted to be filed herein be stricken and
found null .and void in these proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

WM. H. BOWMAN
Attorney for Appellants and
Defendamts
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